to bring judicial review proceedings failed on the basis that the imposition of the government's own policies regarding combating climate change and promoting human rights would interfere with the RBS board of directors' ability to manage the company for the benefit of its shareholders as a whole. In rejecting the interventionist policy proposed by
People and Planet, the court upheld the 'commercial approach' 6 that the government had adopted in respect of its investment in RBS (made as a result of the 'major financial support' 7 extended to the bank in 2008).
Likewise, in the absence of any special status for environmental claims in insolvency law, academic interest has centred on cases involving the use of the disclaimer provision s.178
Insolvency Act 1986 ('IA 1986'). This empowers a liquidator to disclaim onerous property (defined as 'any unprofitable contract' or property which is unsaleable or capable of giving rise to financial or other onerous obligations 8 ), thereby terminating the company's rights, interests and obligations in respect of such property, and leaving anyone who has sustained loss or damage in consequence of the disclaimer to prove a claim as a creditor in the winding-up. 9 Case law has highlighted the tension between the use of this power in liquidation to achieve the 'orderly and expeditious winding up of a company's affairs' 10 , and 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 serious detriment to the amenities of the locality…collectively known in the waste management industry as "the three evils"'. 12 This tension has been settled in favour of the former interest, meaning that the costs of compliance with a waste management licence could not take priority over the debts owed by a company, nor could the company's assets be 'set aside to pay for future compliance with the terms of the licence'. 13 Thus, in the absence of clear words preventing s.178 from being applied to specific items of property or specific types of debtors, liquidators have been held to be entitled to disclaim waste management licences as onerous property.
14 It may be expected that the goal of environmental protection can be more easily achieved in circumstances where the emphasis is on rescuing, rather than liquidating, a financially distressed company to ensure its continued operation. Administration proceedings, for example, have the primary goal of 'rescuing the company as a going concern'. 15 The Cork Committee, which recommended the introduction of the administration procedure, 16 was conscious of the potentially disastrous impact of the 'chain reaction consequent upon any given failure' on creditors, employees and the community, 17 a policy embraced by the 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 damaged colliery, which would otherwise have cost more than £100,000 per week to maintain. 22 Similarly, the liquidation of two major coal mining operators in 2013, Aardvark (TMC) Ltd ('ATL') and The Scottish Coal Company Ltd ('SCC'), was structured in such a way that viable mining sites which were capable of being immediately transferred were sold to the purchaser Hargreaves Services plc ('HSP'), while more problematic mining sites which were not capable of being transferred immediately were hived down to ATL/SCC subsidiaries -the shareholding in which would in due course be conveyed to HSP. 23 The remaining sites which carried substantial restoration liabilities were disclaimed by the liquidators. 24 While recourse to the disclaimer powers (which are only available in 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 25 was justified on the ground of avoiding prejudice to unsecured creditors, 26 it is evident that the transactions as a whole were viewed as being widely beneficial. A significant number of jobs were preserved and on-going production was secured, 27 and the number of properties requiring disclaimer was minimized. 28 This handful of examples indicates, at the very least, that the interplay between company/insolvency and environmental law is not quite clear-cut. In particular, the treatment of the mining sites in the recent UK Coal, Aardvark and Scottish Coal Company liquidations shows how insolvency proceedings are capable of being used in a rather strategic way, with a view to mitigating (rather than sidestepping) environmental liabilities.
It has been questioned, based on previous case law, 29 whether it should fall to the judiciary to resolve the 'complex policy issues' arising in the clashes between environmental and insolvency law. 30 In similar vein, it may be debated whether the distinct solutions arrived at 25 s. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 
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II. 'Scary stories' in the US
The research for this paper was motivated by an empirical study conducted in the US by
Lawton and Oswald, published in 2008. 32 Against the background of criticisms and calls for the reform of environmental, corporate and bankruptcy law triggered by high-profile cases, they sought to determine 'whether firms are indeed inappropriately using bankruptcy as a way to escape environmental liabilities on any sort of pervasive, wide-scale basis'. 33 They argued that radical revisions of these areas of law should be preceded (and justified with reference to) some investigation into the existence and nature of the problem, compared to the 'scary stories' which had so far dominated the discussion surrounding the subject. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 The findings of the study challenged many widely-held beliefs regarding the scale of the problem and the pressing need for legal reform. One view, for example, was that companies routinely avoided environmental liabilities by declaring bankruptcy, effectively exploiting the 'loophole' whereby debt obligations are discharged through insolvency. 41 The study in fact found that environmental liabilities or violations influenced the decision to enter into Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings in less than 1% of the cases studied.
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Similarly, there was little support for the notion that the bankruptcy process enables the burden of the costs of environmental remediation to be pushed onto taxpayers through State intervention to clean up sites: overall, the bankruptcy process did not enable such debtors to transfer the burden of environmental remediation costs to taxpayers through State intervention. 43 In fact, the discharge of environmental debts occurred in less than 2% of the cases examined, indicating that 'the shedding of environmental liabilities through the bankruptcy discharge simply is not a common problem'. 44 liquidation 'in order to reduce the quantum of clean-up costs which they would have to bear in administration or similar proceedings' and thereby protect the debts they would recover from being further diminished 69 is borne out in the recent Scottish Coal and UK Coal insolvencies. As sketched in Part I above, in these instances liquidation proceedings were embarked on for the purpose of enabling the disclaimer power (which applies only to companies which are being wound up 70 ) to be used to minimise the insolvent estate's exposure to clean-up costs -a motivation acknowledged in the litigation concerning the abandonment of statutory licences and land held by the Scottish Coal Company Ltd.
71
The disclaimer facility also enabled the liquidators of UK Coal Ltd to dispense with a firedamaged colliery on the basis that this 'was a high risk site with substantial liabilities attaching to it. The costs of securing and holding the mine … would have been an expense and, as such … would have been paid ahead of the dividend to creditors'. 72 Similarly to the case of Scottish Coal, this entry into liquidation for the purpose of disclaiming sites and/or statutory licences proved necessary notwithstanding the fact that it had been possible to sell or restructure the bulk of the debtors' business or assets. 73 Thus, although the case law 68 Adding to this cautionary note, this paper argues that any shift in insolvency policy towards allowing environmental liabilities to be satisfied before repayment to creditors, should furthermore be informed by an analysis of the means by which environmental law and policy mechanisms enable the scale of such liabilities to be minimised, and thus affect the need for reform. It begins by highlighting and evaluating some relevant factors below.
IV. Factors limiting the incidence of environmental claims in the UK
Baird contends that where environmental regulations are seen to have a limited effect in the context of insolvency, firms may be encouraged to initiate proceedings to avoid their obligations. 80 Conversely, as argued in this paper, the effectiveness of the policies and regulations which apply outside insolvency can reduce the motivation or likelihood for companies to resort to proceedings as a means of escaping their environmental obligations.
It is therefore worth examining how far insolvency risks are directly considered and/or mitigated through tools such as (a) the operation of the contaminated land regime, (b)
criminal sentencing practice, and (c) the growing emphasis on the environment as a tool for economic growth. These are considered in turn below. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 60
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IV(a) Role of the contaminated land regime
The regime for dealing with historical problems of contaminated land occupies an important place among the different types of financial obligations related to the environment which can arise. The costs of remediating contaminated land can be substantial -running into millions of pounds, 81 and therefore potentially overwhelming for a debtor. The original polluter of the land may be incapable of fulfilling its responsibility to bear these costs 82 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 The combination of financial orders must be sufficiently substantial to have a real economic impact which will bring home to both management and shareholders the need to improve regulatory compliance. Whether the fine will have the effect of putting the offender out of business will be relevant; in some bad cases this may be an acceptable consequence.'
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Further 'factual elements' relevant to increasing or reducing the proposed fine include the extent to which a fine impairs the offender's ability to compensate victims or make the organisational changes necessary to improve compliance, and the impact of the fine on employees, customers/service users and the local economy. 117 In considering an offender's ability to pay a financial penalty, the court has 'the power to allow time for payment or to order that the amount be paid in instalments'. 118 The existence of corporate group relationships, viewed in academic literature as a means of curbing liability through the use of subsidiaries which are undercapitalised or subject to intra-group transfers of value, 119 is relevant to the adjustment of fines insofar as a court considering an offender's financial circumstances may be influenced by any demonstration 'that the resources of a linked organisation are available and can properly be taken into account'. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 This matter involved appeals by Sellafield Ltd ('SL') and Network Rail Infrastructure Ltd ('NRIL') against fines between £500,000-£700,000 for breach of requirements for the storage and disposal of radioactive waste, and a collision at an unmanned level crossing respectively, on the basis that the fines were manifestly excessive. Comparing the governance of SL with that of NRIL, the Court of Appeal considered that it was evident that the imposition of a fine would affect them differently. As an 'ordinary commercial company', 135 SL's shareholders enjoyed profits by way of dividend and were few enough in number to be able to hold the directors to account for criminal breaches and future compliance; 136 whereas NRIL was owned by a parent body which was a 'not for dividend company' 137 and invested its profits in the railway infrastructure 'for the public benefit'. 138 A substantial fine could therefore harm the public interest by undermining investment in the rail network and creating a deficit which would necessitate support from State funds. 139 The court nonetheless had regard to evidence that directors' bonus remuneration had been reduced partly due to NRIL's poor safety record, a material factor in cases 'where a fine inflicts no direct punishment on anyone':
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If…a bonus incentivises an executive director to perform better, the prospect of a significant reduction of a bonus will incentivise the executive directors on the board of companies such as Network Rail to pay the highest attention to protecting the lives of those who are at real risk from its activities. In short, it will demonstrate to the court the company's 135 Ibid, [7] . 136 Ibid, [56] . 137 Ibid, [57] . 138 Ibid, [69] . 139 Ibid. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 Ltd, 142 which indicates that in sentencing very large commercial organisations run for profit, the courts are not bound to adhere to, or even to start from, the range of fines provided by the Sentencing Council in relation to large organisations. 143 In the most severe of these cases, regard to an offender's full financial circumstances 144 could well result in a fine representing 'a substantial percentage, up to 100%, of the company's pre-tax net profit for the year in question … even if this results in fines in excess of £100 million'. 145 These are consistent with the size of fines imposed in the financial services sector for breach of regulations. 146 In the same vein, it may be anticipated that the necessity of bringing home the aggravating effect of repeated offences to directors and shareholders in this context will bring about a significant increase in the level of fines, to an extent that would be 'sufficient 140 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 60
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to have a material impact on the finances of the company as a whole'. 147 Dismissing this appeal against a £250,000 fine, the Court of Appeal asserted that it would not have hesitated to uphold 'a very substantially higher fine' 148 -an outcome in keeping with its stance in previous cases involving environmental offences, against interfering with fines markedly greater than six figures. 149 The financial implications of criminal sentencing practice should accordingly produce a severely punitive or deterrent effect 150 for large and very large companies, as compared with small and medium enterprises, a point emphasised in the judgment:
Even in the case of a large organisation with a hitherto impeccable record, the fine must be large enough to bring the appropriate message home to the directors and shareholders and to punish them. In the case of repeat offenders, the fine should be far higher and should rise to the level necessary to ensure that the directors and shareholders of the organisation take effective measures properly to reform themselves and ensure that they fulfil their environmental obligations.
151
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IV(c)(ii) Waste policy and economic growth
This co-option of regulatory protection interests into the economic growth agenda, although somewhat nascent, seems set to curtail rather than strengthen the likelihood of environmental claims featuring widely in corporate insolvencies. The link between environmental and economic interests is further supported by the development of policies surrounding the prevention and reuse of waste. The Government has identified a crucial priority to boost economic growth 'whilst continuing to improve the environment' through 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 184 It consequently advocates that State policy regarding waste be re-designated 'resources', with responsibility for its oversight and implementation transferred from Defra to DBIS where it would enjoy 'strong sectoral support as a commercial opportunity' rather than remaining confined to environmental considerations. 185 At European Union level, this outlook is expressed in policy moves aimed at transforming Europe 'into a more competitive resource-efficient economy' through measures including legislative proposals on waste targets. 186 It is thus widely recognised that the exploitation of economic opportunities provided by waste can contribute to a reduction in landfill 187 by diverting waste for the purpose of converting it into valuable assets, 188 and promoting resource efficiency through the reuse/recycling 189 and enhanced durability 190 of products. Development of these policies may affect the incidence of claims arising from waste management operations, including potential civil claims arising from the effects of poor waste management on human health. 191 It may furthermore assist in easing pressures on landfill operators: the financial distress and dissolution of companies in this sector has in the past been attributed to the weight of environmental protection requirements. 192 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 193 Proponents argue that increasing the visibility of nature in an economic sense will help to prevent continued unsustainable levels of damage by ensuring that all benefits attached to such assets are accounted for by valuing them, and using techniques such as pollution taxes to avert a decline in their 'overall amount and condition'. 194 This would enable businesses to identify and avoid costly or hazardous risks and practices, for instance opting to develop brownfield sites rather than destroy woodland areas. 195 Additional motivation may be provided in future by the introduction of environmental impact bonds, under which the government would contract to pay a certain amount in exchange for the fulfilment of environmental targets. 196 It has yet to be seen to what extent this growing consensus towards economic interests being promoted, rather than impeded, by environmental protection objectives (and contributing positively to the latter) will have a discernible or lasting impact. corporations among its members 199 -more than 40 of whom have led the first trial of the protocol. 200 Although the protocol promises to be useable 'in different business applications'
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at 'different organizational levels' in 'all business sectors across all geographies', 201 it may prove difficult for an instrument of such breadth to meet the needs of a wide variety of business types and sizes.
Arguably, the motivation for large companies to engage with such initiatives may stem more forcefully from their exposure to substantial criminal penalties for environmental offences 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 safe management of waste are small and medium-sized enterprises. 203 The impact of the developments outlined above might therefore take some time to permeate all relevant types of business operations.
V. Conclusions
Ultimately, the issue of how the law can effectively respond to situations where a company which is subject to environmental obligations becomes insolvent should be addressed, in particular the question whether it calls for resolution through legislative reform. This paper questions the urgency of such reform, taking account of the extent to which certain mechanisms within the framework of environmental protection already play a part in tempering the danger of (or necessity for) a company to rely on insolvency proceedings for shelter from such liabilities. There is room to explore the scope for these, and any other mechanisms, to be developed in a way that more strongly supports the diminution of this insolvency risk -without compromising the goal of environmental protection.
It is accepted that the mechanisms considered above are not without their weaknesses.
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